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Special Commentary

Has the United States Lost the Ability to Fight a
Major War?
Steven Metz

Abstract: The 2015 National Military Strategy identifies war with a
major power as a “growing” possibility. The more the United States
demonstrates it is willing and able to undertake a big war, the more
unlikely it is that it will have to do so. Thus, the US military should
undertake analyses, wargames, and exercises focused on rapid expansion of the force, to include creating new formations.

A

fter the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States the
focus of the American military shifted quickly and dramatically.
Previously, most attention was on quick, high-tempo operations
against the conventional forces of “rogue states.” Using advanced technology and exquisitely trained units, the US military was designed to
crush state adversaries in short order. Desert Storm was the prevailing
paradigm.1
After September 11, the US intervention in Afghanistan, and the
outbreak of insurgency in Iraq in 2003, the American military quickly
shifted to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and “man hunting.”
This was a deep and far-ranging change. The human domain of warfare,
which had drifted into insignificance during the “revolution in military
affairs” of the 1990s, returned with a vengeance. Conventional forces
learned the importance of cultural understanding in counterinsurgency.
Special operations forces moved from the periphery to the centerpiece
of American military strategy.2 The military and the intelligence communities fused together to identify opponents and neutralize them. The
defense industry provided a massive array of equipment and systems
optimized for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. While this
was a dramatically different type of activity than anyone had expected,
thought about, and prepared for, the US military adapted on the fly.
While the American military was learning to fight extremists,
insurgents, and terrorists, conventional war was given little thought and
effort. As US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq subsided, defense
officials and military leaders began redefining their focus once again.
This has proved difficult. In the past, adversaries—whether the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or the Iraqi and
Afghan insurgents—drove such reorientations and provided a beacon
to guide defense policymakers and military leaders. In the contemporary

1      For background, see Steven Metz, “America’s Defense Transformation: A Conceptual and
Political History,” Defence Studies 6, no. 1 (March 2006): 1-25.
2      See Steven Metz, “Role Reversal: US Special Operations Forces After the Long War,”
World Politics Review, March 3, 2015, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15209/rolereversal-u-s-special-operations-forces-after-the-long-war.
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security environment, there is no predominant adversary. This complicates the military’s ongoing reorientation since optimizing for one
type of conflict or enemy results in suboptimizing for others. What is
clear, though, is that the military must prepare for both irregular or state
opponents. As the 2015 National Military Strateg y stated:
For the past decade, our military campaigns primarily have consisted of
operations against violent extremist networks. But today, and into the foreseeable future, we must pay greater attention to challenges posed by state
actors...Today, the probability of US involvement in interstate war with a
major power is assessed to be low but growing.3

This is easy—and important—to say, but tough to do in an increasingly
austere resource environment.
A future interstate war with a major power would not reprise Desert
Storm or the 2003 invasion of Iraq in which the US military overwhelmed
enemy forces in lightening campaigns with limited American casualties.
Chances are it would be costly and possibly long. As the two world wars
showed, major powers sometimes go to war expecting a short conflict—
a Franco-Prussian War—only to stumble into a long, bloody slogging
match. Even though every American wants to avoid this situation, it is
important to consider its possibility. Since the National Military Strateg y
identifies interstate war with a major power as a “growing” probability,
Americans must ask themselves whether the United States could still
fight a conflict lasting years and demanding a major expansion of the
armed forces.
History provides a platform for such thinking. The American tradition was to build only a “big war” military when it was needed and
then demobilize it as soon as possible. The United States kept a small
professional army and navy between big wars for pacifying the frontier,
guarding the coast, keeping sea-lanes safe, and—importantly—to form
cadres when it had to mobilize for big wars. The Cold War altered this
tradition to an extent. As the United States assumed the role of global
superpower and guarantor of stability around the world, the immense,
and threatening Soviet military required the United States to sustain
large forces in peacetime; the Korean War demonstrated neither the
United Nations nor the US nuclear arsenal alone would deter communist aggression.
Although the hope was the Second World War had finally been the
big war to end all big wars, American policymakers and military leaders
recognized the capability to fight major conventional wars remained
vital. But this had to be different: American strategists did not think
they would have time to create a large military, as during the world
wars. To avoid the financial and political costs of keeping huge forces
at the ready, as the Soviet Union did, the United States combined active
and fully equipped and trained reserve units. The idea was allies and
forward-deployed US air and land forces could hold the Soviets until the
United States mobilized its reserves, deployed them, and shifted other
active units to the combat zone. It was a more frugal way of having a
big war capability, one that made heavy use of American air and naval
superiority.
3      US Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States, 2015 (Washington,
DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2015), 3-4.
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With the demise of the Soviet Union, sustaining a big war capability seemed less important. But unlike the end of the two world wars,
American political and military leaders did not abandon this capability wholesale but simply downgraded it. The idea was the US military
could undertake at least short major wars. This approach was possible
because the American military was so qualitatively and technologically
superior to any anticipated enemy force. Luckily, this assumption was
never tested by a serious enemy.
Now the qualitative advantages undergirding US military strategy
are eroding. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work phrased
it, “our technological superiority is slipping. We see it every day.”4 At
the same time, possible adversaries are increasing defense spending
while many of America’s most important allies are slashing theirs. This
development may lead potential enemies to believe as Tojo, Hitler, and
Saddam Hussein did that they can either make intervention so costly
that US policymakers will reject it in the first place, or withstand a US
onslaught and force a negotiated settlement that reaps the fruits of their
aggression. Put differently, US policymakers and military leaders are
aware of the growing big war problem but have not yet found a solution.
Today, three plausible scenarios might compel American involvement in a big war. The first would be military aggression from North
Korea, possibly a missile barrage or nuclear attack against US targets or
a key American ally like South Korea or Japan. If this involved nuclear
weapons the United States might have to invade North Korea and replace
the Kim regime. Destroying North Korean conventional forces would
be costly but would not take long. But there would then be extended
period of pacification and occupation, possibly even large-scale counterinsurgency. The second plausible scenario would be Russian military
aggression against a US ally, particularly a member of NATO. The third
would be Chinese aggression against American partners in the Asia
Pacific, or against the United States itself.
Of these three, only the first would likely lead to a strategically
decisive outcome in the mode of World War II: regime change and
democratization. Baring regime collapse in Russia or China, the other
two would probably follow the anticipated pattern for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe during the Cold War, ending with a restoration
of pre-conflict borders and, hopefully, weakened, chastised, and less
aggressive regimes.
Whatever the precipitant, the decision to undertake a big war would
be extraordinarily difficult because of the costs it would entail. Such an
effort could not be put on the national credit card the way American
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan were. A big war would mean
higher taxes, probably much higher. It would force Americans to postpone or forego consumption and possibly involve World War II-style
rationing. While there might be an initial surge in military volunteers,
a big war might require a draft. The public might bear these costs if
the stakes were high enough, but policymakers could not automatically
assume so. After all, when the United States entered World War II the
American public was already accustomed to enduring sacrifices after a
4      US Army War College Strategy Conference, Comments as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of
Defense Bob Work, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 8, 2015.

10

Parameters 45(2) Summer 2015

decade of economic depression. Today, the public is unaccustomed to
crushing taxation or postponed consumption. It would not take long
for dissatisfaction to grow, possibly generating pressure to negotiate a
settlement short of victory.
A big war would also require Americans to stop the hyperpartisanship that paralyzes security policy today. Even during the Cold War
partisan politics never did fully stop “at the water’s edge” as Senator
Arthur Vandenberg phrased it, but there were limits to it when dealing
with foreign enemies. Now security policy is used as a partisan cudgel
even when it benefits America’s adversaries. Involvement in a big war
would only be possible if that stopped, and Americans from across the
political spectrum rallied behind whomever is president.
The costs and challenges of involvement in a big war do not stop
there. For instance, a future big war would see many more challenges
to the American homeland than in the past. During the two world wars
there were attempts at sabotage in the United States, a few submarine
attacks, and, in World War II, some hare-brained schemes for longrange bombing from Japan and Germany; but the direct threat to the
United States was minimal. Those days are over: future wars are likely
to see extensive terrorist and cyber attacks on the United States and a
range of economic attacks. To fight a future big war, then, the United
States would have to expand its homeland security force as much as
its expeditionary military. But resources devoted to the expansion of
homeland security, whether money, people, bandwidth, equipment, or
something else, would be resources unavailable to the expeditionary
military. Moreover, the American public would have to accept a level
of risk, as well as surveillance and curtailment of civil liberties unseen
since the Civil War.
Given all this, would US leaders and the American public accept
the costs of a big war? As always, the answer is “it depends.” If the
nightmarish North Korean regime uses nuclear weapons, there would
be no alternative. Most Americans would support regime change in that
case at almost any cost. Aggression by Russia or China in their own
regions, even if against an American ally or friendly nation, would be
more complicated. Some Americans would feel the blood and monetary
costs of reversing aggression by a powerful state in its own region outweighed the benefits. It is impossible to know in advance whether this
would be a majority or minority position, but it would certainly be more
pronounced than hitherto, when the United States expected all of its
wars to be short.
The way Chinese or Russian aggression unfolded would also complicate an American response. Neither is likely to undertake the sort
of brazen aggression like Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Their opening moves would be “camouflaged” aggression to weaken
their victims rather than simply sending their own divisions across international borders. They would launch unattributable cyber and economic
attacks. This type of veiled aggression would make it difficult—but not
impossible—for whomever is president to commit the United States
to war. After all, had Japan not attacked Pearl Harbor even a politician as skilled as Franklin Roosevelt might not have been able to go to
war against Japan and Germany, even at a time with significantly less

Special Commentary

Metz

11

partisanship in security policy and a with a public more accustomed to
sacrifice and deference to national leaders.
Even if American policymakers were considering involvement in
a big war, what would the military’s leaders tell them? It is not hard
to imagine a future president asking, “General or Admiral, if we do
this and it does not end quickly, can the military expand? Can it build
new ground units, new naval and air squadrons, new cyber defense and
attack organizations?” Such questions would certainly give military
leaders pause. The problem would not be recruits. There would be a
rush of those, at least at first. Training installations could be expanded
or built in relatively short order. The challenge would be equipping and
supplying the new units given the decline of the US defense industry and
its reliance on foreign materials and talent. The United States was able
to mobilize for World War II in part because it had an excess of industrial capacity due to the Great Depression. It also had abundant human
capacity to tap for war production: women. Now, with the widespread
stress on “ just in time/just enough” principles, the full utilization of the
work force, and globalized outsourcing, the United States has almost
no excess industrial or logistics infrastructure, or human capacity to
mobilize for war.
That might force future military leaders to advise the president
they could build new units, squadrons, and organizations; but these
would be inferior to pre-war ones not only in training, leadership, and
experience, but also in equipment. Military leaders would then have
to decide whether pre-war doctrine and operational concepts could be
implemented by new, inferior formations, or whether they would need
simpler—and possibly less effective—doctrine the new forces could
follow. Alternatively, military leaders might also consider technological
solutions. The new formations built during the military expansion might
rely more heavily than pre-war ones on autonomous systems of all types,
assuming industry could quickly produce thousands of new autonomous
systems given economic, technological, and human constraints.
All things considered, politically and psychologically the United
States could still fight a big war. While there has been growing support for
some degree of strategic disengagement in recent years, most Americans
still value global leadership and the tradition of opposing armed aggression. They would heed a call from political leaders to do this again, if
necessary. But the old model of a relatively leisurely expansion of the
US military while allies bore the brunt of the fighting is bankrupt. A
future president might be faced with the horrible decision of deciding
whether to sacrifice the pre-war US military to hold the line while new
formations are created, or simply to accept aggression.
The more the United States demonstrates it is willing and able to
undertake a big war, the less likely it is that it will have to do so. Past
enemies believed the United States did not have the will to fight a major
conventional war, and thus would leave them with what they gained by
armed aggression. Many found that assumption was wrong. By demonstrating the ability to fight a big war once again, the United States can
actually lower the chances of it happening. Inversely, assuming there
will be no more big wars increases the probability of their occurrence.
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Communicating both will and capability—and tamping the hyperpartisanship paralyzing American strategy—are largely the jobs of
political leaders. But the military has a vital role to play as well. All the
services should grapple with the challenges they might face fighting a
big war and in rapidly expanding the size of their forces. The Joint Force
should have a series of analyses, wargames, and exercises focused on
rapid expansion, to include creating new formations, both expeditionary
and those dedicated to homeland security roles. There should be a single
organization within the Joint Force specifically assigned responsibility
for understanding, preparing for, and planning big wars requiring full
national mobilization.
The Army in particular has talked about “expansibility” as it has
gotten smaller. One key component of that discussion is abandoning
the “just in time/just enough” mindset. Expansibility requires excess
capacity during peacetime and top-heavy organizations to provide
foundations for expansion. It requires keeping unneeded installations
and equipment as hedges against the future. Yet, in a political climate
of increasing frugality, pressure is on all the services to get rid of excess
capacity. Outgoing Army Chief of Staff GEN Raymond Odierno has
already warned the public that his service is “dangerously close” to
being cut so much it will not be able to perform its existing missions.5
America’s margin of safety is the smallest it has been for many decades.
If this trend continues, the capacity to expand and to fight a big war
may atrophy all together. A future president might face a time when he
or she feels fighting a big war is in America’s vital national interest, but
may then discover it lacks the capacity to do so. If so, the United States
might be forced to accept the outcome of aggression not because it is
wise, but because it is the only option.

5      Michelle Tan, “Odierno: Army ‘Dangerously Close’ to Being Cut Too Deep,” Army Times,
August 11, 2015.

